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Abstract 
An ontology of geographic kinds is designed to yield a better understanding of the 
~tructure. of the geographic world, and to support the development of geographic 
mformat10n systems that are conceptually sound. This paper first demonstrates 
th~t geograp~cal obje~ts and kinds are not just larger versions of the everyday 
objects and kinds prev10usly studied in cognitive science. Geographic objects are 
not merely located in space, as are the manipulable objects of table-top space. 
Rather, .they ar~ tied intrinsically to space, and this means .that their spatial 
boundanes are m many cases the most salient features for categorization. The 
ontology presented here will accordingly be based on topology (the theory of 
boundary, contact and separation) and on mereology (the theory of extended 
wh?les and part~). Geographic reality comprehendsmesoscopic entities, many of 
which are best viewed as shadows cast onto the spatial plane by human reasoning 
and language .. Because of this, geographic categories are much more likely to 
show cultural differences in category definitions than are the manipulable objects 
of table-top space. 
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1 Introduction 
Ontology de~ls :-Vith th~ nature of being. Communication requires a sharing of ontology between 
the commumcatmg parties: The formal description of ontology is thus essential to data exchange 
standards, and to the design of human-computer interfaces. In this paper, we describe some 
fundame~tals of the ontology of geographic space and of the objects and phenomena of 
geographic space. 
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1.1 Why Construct an Ontology? 
An ontology of geographic kinds, of the categories or entity types in the domain of geographic 
objects, is designed to yield a better understanding of the. structure of the geographic world. The 
results can be of practical importance in at least the followmg ways: 
First understanding the ontology of geographic kinds can help us to understand how different grou~s of humans, for example different armies in a multinational coalition in time of war, 
exchange, or fail to exchange, geographic information. 
Second, understanding the ontology of geographic kinds can help us to understand certain 
characteristic types of distortions that are involved in our cognitive relations to geographic 
phenomena. Above all, there are tendencies in the conceptualization of geopolitical entities that 
underlie certain forms of territorially based conflict. 
Third, geographic information systems need to manipulate representations of geogr~phic entiti~s, 
and ontological study of the corresponding entity types, especially those at the basic level, will 
provide default characteristics for such systems. 
Fourth, entity types are a central issue in data exchange standards, where a substantial part of the 
semantics of the data may be carried by the types that instances are assigned to (Mark 1993). 
Research in ontology as a basis for the development of knowledge-interchange standards has 
expanded tremendously in recent years (Gruber 1993). This paper is designed as a contribution to 
such research in the specific field of geography. 
1.2 Specific Marks of Geographic Kinds 
In what follows, we shall be interested in the theoretical peculiarities of geographic kinds- in 
those features that set them apart from kinds of other sorts. These features derive primarily from 
the fact that geographic objects are not merely located in space, but are tied intrinsically to space 
in a manner that implies that they inherit from space many of its structural (mereological, 
topological, geometrical) properties. 
Existing research on cognitive categories has standardly addressed entities on the sub-geographic 
· scale: manipulable entities of the table-top world, objects of roughly human scale. (birds, pets, 
toys) and other similar phenomena. For such entities, the 'what' and the 'where' are almost always 
independent. In the geographic world, in contrast, the 'what' and the 'where' are intimately 
intertwined. In the geographic world, categorization is also very often size- or scale-dependent. 
(Consider: pond, lake, sea, ocean.) In the geographic world, to a much greater extent than in the 
world of table-top space, the realization that a thing exists at all may have individual or cultural 
variability. In the geographic world, too, the boundaries of the objects with which we have to deal 
are themselves salient phenomena for purposes of categorization. These boundaries may be crisp 
or graded, and they may be subject to dispute. Moreover, the identification of what a thing is may 
influence the location and structure of the boundary; for example, if a given topographic feature is 
identified as a marsh, then its boundary may be located farther up the slope than would be the 
boundary of the same feature if it had been identified as a lake. These are all features of 
categorization that are all but absent from the table-top world upon which theories of 
categorization have hitherto been based. 
1.3 Categories versus Sets 
Science has typically modeled categories as sets in the mathematical sense, and the assumption of 
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a se~-theoretic mo.de~ of categories is co~on~y .made in feature. coding schemes, either explicitly 
(as i~ geocartographic data standards) or implicitly. Every possible object or event is assumed to 
be either a member or not a member of each particular set. This view of categories also assumes 
that there are procedures or rules available for determining set membership from the observabl 
characteristics of the individual. Furthermore, it is assumed that every member of a set would b: 
an equally good exemplar of that set. This familiar model also underlies multivariate mathematical 
model~ of classes, such as those used in discriminant analysis, and in most forms of cluster 
analysis. 
The pro~lems with th~ se!-theoretic model as an account of the categories used by ordinary 
humans m everyday situat10ns are clear. For most such categories, and for most people, some 
members are better examples of the class than are others; furthermore, there is a great degree of 
agreement ai:r10ng human subjects as to what constitute good and bad examples. Rosch and others 
have accordmgly proposed that ~atural kinds be seen as possessing a radial structure, having 
pro~oty~es of more central or typical members surrounded by a penumbra of less central or less 
typical mstances (Rosch 1973, 1978). Following Couclelis (1988), Mark (1989), and Mark and 
Frank (1996), a view along these lines will be accepted in what follows. 
1.4 Basic Tools of Ontology: Mereology and Topology 
Geographic objects are spatial objects on or near the surface of the earth. Furthermore they are 
o~je~ts of .a certain minimal scale (roughly: of a scale such that they cannot be surveyed unaided 
within a smgle perceptual act). Geographic objects are typically complex, and they will in every 
case have parts. An adequate ontology of geographic objects must therefore contain a theory of 
part and whole, or mereology (Simons 1987). 
Geog.raphic objects do not merely have constituent object-parts, they also have boundaries, which 
co~tn?ute .as much to the~r ontological make-up as do the constituents that they comprehend in 
their ~ntenors. Geographic objects are prototypically connected or contiguous, but they are 
sometimes scattered or separated. They are sometimes closed (e.g., lakes), and sometimes open 
(e.g., bays). Note that the above concepts of contiguity and closure are topological notions, and 
thus an. adequa!e o~tology of geographic objects must contain also a topology, a theory of 
boundaries and mtenors, of connectedness and separation, that is integrated with a mereological 
theory ?f parts and wholes (Smith 1996). The topological structure will bring with it certain sorts 
of duality, thus for example dual to the distinction between the outer boundary and the interior of 
a geographic object is the distinction, within the surrounding container or host between the inner 
boundary of this contain~r and the exterior or hinterland beyond. Our topolo~ical ontology also 
must be a~le to cope with the fact that the very notion of 'boundary' can mean, in different 
contexts, either an ~bstract m~thematical boundary- conceptualized as an infinitely thin line, 
plane or surface that 1s located m space but does not occupy (fill out) space- or a boundary zone 
of small ?ut finite thickness. Bound~es in the abstract sense are normally seen as falling within' 
th~ ~rovmce of standard mathematical topology. For geographical purposes, however, even 
w1thm the category of abstract boundaries there are certain sorts of boundary phenomena which 
~tandard topology cannot ~eal with. If we cut an object- for instance a land parcel, or an island-
m half, we are not left with one piece that is closed and another that is not. This is because 
abstract bound~ries. do not take up space, and thus they can be perfectly co-located one with 
anothe~. To d? Justice to such phenomena we need to use special mereotopological theories that 
depart m crucial ways from standard topology (Smith and Varzi 1997). 
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An object is 'closed' in the mereotopological sense, if it includes its outer boundary as part; it is 
'open' if this outer boundary is included rather in its complement. Ordinary material objects are in 
unproblematic fashion the owners of their surfaces. Where a complement meets an object of this 
sort, the object will be closed and the complement open (Asher and Vieu 1995). Regarding 
geographic objects, however, matters are not so simple. Consider the mouth of a volcano: where 
the hole meets its material host (the crater, a concave mass of rock and debris), the boundary of 
the hole is the surface of the host. Thus the boundary of the hole, there, belongs to the volcano, 
and not to the hole itself (Casati and Varzi 1994). Consider, however, the boundary of the hole 
where it is not in contact with its host: the boundary in the region corresponding to the opening of 
the hole where it faces up towards the sky. Where do we place the boundaries corresponding to 
those regions? Within the hole? Within the sky? Either choice would seem arbitrary, and a parallel 
situation is encountered in the case of bays facing out towards the sea. This very arbitrariness will 
reveal important features of geographic objects in general and of their boundaries in particular. 
2 Geographic Categories and the Geometry of Space 
Geographic categories track not only mereology and topology but also qualitative geometry (the 
theory of concavity, convexity, of shortness and longness, the theory of being roughly round or 
roughly dumbbell shaped). A theory of geographic categories must take account, too, of the fact 
that geographic objects may be zero-, one-, two-, or three-dimensional. Consider the North Pole, 
the Equator, Norway (a two-dimensional object with a curvature in three-dimensional space), or 
the North Sea. Consider also that 'North Sea' may refer either to the three-dimensional body of 
water, or to its two-dimensional surface. 'Bay' or 'sound' may refer to the surrounding land, or to 
the indentation in the shoreline, or to a part of the shoreline, as well as the sheet or body of water. 
Note that there are different meanings of 'in' (and of other spatial prepositions) according to what 
the relevant dimension in a given context might be: the island is 'in' the lake means, in one sense, 
that it protrudes from the surface of the lake, in another sense that it is completely submerged 
within the corresponding three-dimensional volume. 
Ontologists since Aristotle have distinguished between two sorts of predications: categorial 
predications as we are here using this term (called by Aristotelians 'predications in the category of 
substance'): is a man, is a fish, is a lake, etc.; and accidental predications (or 'predications in the 
category of accident'), for example: is red, is colored, is big, is hungry. The former tell us under 
what category an object falls. They tell us what an object is. The latter tell us how an object is, per 
accidens, at a given moment; thus they pertain to ways in which instances of the relevant 
categories change from occasion to occasion. 
There is no term for 'big dog' or 'small dog' corresponding to 'lake' and 'pond'. Why not? Because 
size for living objects is not usually a categorical matter but is an attribute that changes over time. 
In contrast, instances of geographic categories characteristically do not grow or shrink (as animals 
do). In this case, size and shape may be matters for categorical predication. The question still 
remains whether lake is a basic level category in the sense of Rosch (1978). Is pond a subordinate 
subclass, a-kind-of lake? Or are lakes and ponds both categories at the basic level, distinguished 
mainly by size? Bay and cove, mountain and hill, form similar pairs. Empirical research with 
human subjects will be needed to answer this and similar questions. 
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3 Levels of Reality 
3.1 Spatial Reality 
We use 'entity' and 'object' synonymously as ontological terms of art comprehending things, 
relations, boundaries, events, processes, qualities, quantities of all sorts. More specifically, in the 
context of geographic ontology, 'object' and 'entity' shall comprehend regions, boundaries, parcels 
of land, water-bodies, roads, buildings, bridges, and so on, as well as the parts and aggregates of 
all of these. 
We assume the existence of a real world, populated by real entities occupying regions of space. 
Spatial regions form a relational system, comprising also containment relations, separation 
relations, relations of adjacency and overlap, and so on (Egenhofer and Herring 1991). We 
assume also the existence of a relation of being located at between things on the one hand (roads, 
forests, wetlands), and the regions in or at which they are located on the other (Casati and Varzi 
1996). 
3.2 The Cognitive Domain 
On the other hand, there is the domain of cognition, of concepts, perception, memory, reasoning 
and action. Counterparts of spatial relations exist in this conceptual realm, too. Our cognitive acts 
are directed towards spatial objects in the world. Interestingly, though, these acts themselves exist 
in a spatial domain: they are tied to our bodies, which themselves exist in spatial reality, so that 
some of our spatial concepts, like here or there, are egocentric. Concepts therefore work spatially 
in manifold fashion: i) through abstract models or representations of space in our minds, as when 
we think, abstractly, about whether Peru is to the North or to the South of Ghana; ii) through a 
concrete being-in-space, when we use indexical spatial concepts such as yonder, to the right, 
down east, etc.; and iii) through different sorts of mixtures of these. With geographic information 
systems (GIS) there is also iv): conceptual interaction with spatial entities that is mediated 
through mathematical models and through computer representations. 
Matters are complicated further by the fact that our cognitive representations of space may be 
under-defined or erroneous. They may show individual or culture-related differences. They may 
be refined or modified through social and cultural interactions, formal education, and dictionary 
definitions. Some spatial concepts may even be hard-wired into the perceptual systems in the 
senses and brain. Other concepts may be changed through use; thus, once a given concept is 
judged to correspond with a particular situation, then the specifics of that situation may modify 
the concept. 
We assume that people think and reason by manipulating concepts; that computer programs are 
based on formal mathematical counterparts of relations between entities in the world; and that 
people use computers to learn about, understand, or make decisions about such entities. Thus, 
establishing the correspondences and interrelations among the different domains of spatial entities 
and relations is essential to the construction of geographic information systems and of other 
systems for reasoning about spatial entities and relations. 
3.3 Geographic Reality 
Geographic reality has many different sorts of properties, features, entities within it, which can be 
approached theoretically in many different ways. There are aspects of spatial reality that have been 
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well worked out by earth scientists of various sorts. The cognitive aspects of this domain are 
however still little understood from the theoretical point of view. This is because those interested 
in cognition have, with few exceptions, shown little interest in the spatial reality within which 
cognizing subjects are situated, whereas those interested in spatial reality have shown for their 
part little interest in cognition. It is the interactions between these two domains that are the 
principal object of our inquiries here. They relate to the various ways in which human cognition 
and action, including social and political action, lead to effects of an ontological sort within the 
domain of spatial reality. 
To fix our ideas, let us divide spatial reality into two sub-domains or strata, which can be 
conceived, provisionally, as partitions of space at different levels of granularity. (Conceive the two 
strata as laid on top of each other after the fashion of map layers, with the upper stratum 
comprising objects of larger scale.) 
On the one hand is the microphysical stratum of spatial reality- it is spatial reality as it is dealt 
with in the physical sciences. It may be conceived, for present purposes, as a complex edifice of 
molecules. On the other hand is the mesoscopic stratum of spatial reality. This is the real-world 
counterpart of our non-scientific (naive, normal, everyday, lay) cognition and action in space. 
This mesoscopic stratum has three different types of components: 
1. Objects of a straightforwardly physical sort- such as rivers, forests, bridges- that are studied 
also by physics but which, as they are cognized within the mesoscopic stratum, have different 
sorts of properties. (This is in virtue of the fact that our naive cognitidn uses very little 
mathematics, has its own peculiar topology, and endows its objects with qualitative rather than 
quantitative features and with a social and cultural significance that is absent from the 
microphysical realm.) 
2. Geographic objects like bays and promontories, which are also in a sense parts of the physical 
world but which exist only in virtue of demarcations induced by human cognition and action. 
3. Geopolitical objects like nations and neighborhoods which are more than merely physical, and 
which exist only as the hybrid spatial products of human cognition and action. 
· All three sets of components are spatial objects. Indeed we might conceive mesoscopic entities in 
general as shadows cast by human reasoning and language (and by the associated activities) onto 
the spatial plane. All mesoscopic objects exist as parts of spatial reality as we here conceive it. 
This applies even to counties, land-parcels, postal districts, real estate subdivisions, air corridors, 
and so on. 
4 Problems with Geographical Extensions of Theories of Categorization 
Based on the Phenomena of Table-Top Space 
The Roschcstyle examples of small mammals, birds, utensils, etc., that have been most extensively 
treated in the literature on categorization, differ frqm geographic examples in a number of ways. 
First, they almost always involve discrete, movable, items. And while research on categorization 
by cognitive scientists does indeed indicate that humans tend quite generally to discretize even 
where they are dealing with what are essentially continuous phenomena (as is shown, not least, by 
the case of GIS), an adequate ontology of geographic kinds should embrace not only categories of 
discreta but also categories that arise in the realm of continuous phenomena, 
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Table-top examples tend further to reinforce a view according to which nature can be cut at its 
joints- that is, a view to the effect that there is a true, God-given structure, which science 
attempts to make precise. As we shall see, geographic categorization involves a degree of human-
contributed arbitrariness on a number of different levels, and it is in general marked by differences 
in the ways different languages and cultures structure or slice their worlds. It is precisely because 
many geographical kinds result from a more-or-less arbitrary drawing of boundaries in a 
continuum that the category boundaries will likely differ from culture to culture (in ways that can 
lead to sometimes bloody conflict as between one group or culture and another). 
~inally, the familiar Rosch_-style examples form a family of separate categorial systems possessing 
simple _tree. structures, with each tree having little to do with the other trees. Geographic 
categones, m contrast, because they relate to objects intrinsically interrelated together within a 
single domain (called space), form categorial systems that interact to form a single structure. The 
mereological, topological and geometrical, organization of space thus has deep implications for 
the structure of our cognitive system of geographic categories. 
5 The Realm of Fiats 
As shown above, geographic objects will often be identified by specification of the locations of 
their boundaries. It is important to distinguish betweenbonafide and fiat boundaries. Following 
Smith (1995), the former are boundaries that correspond to genuine discontinuities in the world, 
the latter are projected onto geographic space in ways that are to a degree independent of such 
discontinuities. The surfaces of extended objects such as planets or tennis balls are clearly 
boundaries of the bona fide sort. Shorelines and water courses can also readily be considered to 
be bona fide boundaries. In contrast, many state and provincial borders, as well as county lines 
and property lines and the borders of postal districts, provide examples of boundaries of the fiat 
sort, especially in those cases where,· as in the case of Colorado or Alberta, they lie skew to any 
pre-existing qualitative differentiations or spatial discontinuities (coastlines, rivers) in the 
underlying territory. Boundaries of areas of a given soil type, of wetlands, or of bays or mountains 
are also at least partly of the fiat type, although here the boundaries may result from cognitive 
rather than from legal or political processes. 
Once fiat outer boundaries have been recognized, it becomes clear that the opposition between 
bona fide and fiat boundaries can be drawn not merely in relation to boundaries but in relation also 
to the· objects that they bound. Examples of bona fide geographic objects are the planet Earth, 
Vancouver Island, the Dead Sea. Fiat objects include King County, the State of Wyoming, the 
Tropic of Cancer. There are, of course, cases of objects that ought reasonably to be classified as 
fiat objects whose boundaries involve a mixture of bona fide and fiat elements. Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, which together occupy the Island of Hispaniola, are examples which spring 
to mind, but every national boundary will in course of time involve boundary-markers: border-
posts, watch-towers, barbed wire fences and the like, which lend a physical aspect to what was 
initially an object of the fiat sort. 
5.1 Types of fiat boundary 
There are various different ways in which we can divide up the realm of fiat boundaries: some fiat 
boundaries are long-standing, crisp and detenninate, the products of deliberate legislation; others 
are vague or transient, the products of momentary territorial adjustments (for example in battle 
zones). Fiat boundaries all have in common that they exist only in virtue of the different sorts of 
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demarcations effected cognitively and behaviorally by human beings. But they are otherwise of 
many sorts. They may be complete or incomplete, symmetrical or asymmetrical. They may lie 
'entirely skew to all boundaries of the bona fide sort, may involve a combination of fiat and bona 
fide portions, or they may be constructed entirely out of bona fide portions that however, because 
they are not themselves intrinsically connected, must be glued together in fiat fashion in order to 
yield a boundary that is topologically complete. We will deal with this manifold variety of fiat 
boundaries in some detail in what follows. 
5.2 Fiats and vagueness 
There are fiat objects (deserts, valleys, etc.) that are delineated not by crisp outer boundaries but 
rather by boundary-like regions that are to some degree indeterminate. This is not to say that the 
ontology we are here expounding is ultimately vague- that the fundamental categorial scheme 
should allow for a distinction between crisp and scruffy (fuzzy, hazy, indetenninate) entities, as 
some have urged. Rather, vagueness is a conceptual matter: if you point to an irregularly shaped 
protuberance in the sand and say 'dune', then the correlate of your expression is a fiat object 
whose constituent unitary parts are comprehended (articulated) through the concept dune. The 
vagueness of the concept itself is responsible for the vagueness with which the referent of your 
expression is picked out. Each one of a large variety of slightly different and precisely detenninate 
aggregates of molecules has an equal claim to being such a referent. When you have a map, and it 
has a shoreline with ins and outs, and on the water adjacent to one of the ins is a label saying 'Baie 
d'Ecaigrain', it is fairly easy for a human to see where the bay is. The outer boundary of the bay 
(seaward) is probably irrelevant to action or practice, unless some regulators have ceded all the 
islands (or oil) in the bay to some other country. But try to tell a computer that the bay is here, 
and that it extends from there to there on the coastline, but then just fades off to seaward, and get 
the computer to reason with that information the way that a person would. 
Mountains, hills, ridges, also a cape or point- we can all agree that they are real, and that it is 
obvious where the top of a mountain or the end of a cape is to be found. But where is the 
boundary of Cape Flattery on the inland side? Where is the boundary of Mont Blanc among its 
foothills? 
5.3 Consensus Fiats 
Fiat boundaries may be products of informal consensus, reflecting for example linguistic usage as 
this evolves informally over time; Bays, peninsulas, etc.; are parts of spatial reality, physical parts 
of the world itself. But they are parts of reality that would not be there absent corresponding 
linguistic and cultural practices of demarcation and categorization. 
In a world with our everyday human practices, a bay or a hill is just as real as a chair or rock. The 
former are real consensus fiat objects, the latter are real bona fide objects. Bona fide objects are 
for obvious reasons more likely to be objects of categorizations that enjoy a high degree of cross-
cultural invariance. Fiat objects, in contrast, because they are inculcated into the world by 
cognition, are more likely to show cultural dependence. 
5.4 Legal fiats 
Some fiat boundaries, like the boundaries of nations or postal districts, are social entities, 
analogous to rights, claims and obligations. Usually, when the legal system takes a fuzzily 
bounded region, it has to add a rule to crisp up the boundary. Private property in some 
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jurisdictions extends to the mean low water mark, and for any seacoast part of the US or Canada 
you would find a legal definition based on mean low, high, average, etc. tide level, as to where 
private property stops and a commons starts. The boundary between the North West Territories 
and the provinces of Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec around Hudson and James Bays in Canada, 
is the mean low tide level. And then there is a definition of how the boundary crosses the mouths 
of rivers. A legally-protected wetland has to have standing water on average more than n days per 
year. There may also be a minimum size rule. There is an area in Jim's back yard about 3 x 5 
meters, that might qualify as a federal wetland, but might not be detectable by the appropriate 
authorities. 
If one needs to know where the shoreline is, perhaps in order to regulate access or trespassing, 
then one selects some particular stage in the tidal cycle, such as mean low tide level; this produces 
a fiat shoreline that is fixed and reasonably crisp, and that approximates a bona fide shoreline that 
moves with the waves and tides. You cannot see or touch or trip over the fiat shoreline; but the 
fiat shoreline is there, nonetheless, as a part of reality: if you cross it, you may be prosecuted. 
S.S GIS fiats 
Fiat crisping occurs also in the scientific realm. Consider soil, a continuously-varying mass of 
material that lies, in most places, just below the surface of the earth. At a scale of sand grains and 
roots, it might be thought of as made up of a myriad of objects or entities. But at a larger scale, 
the percentage of sand, silt, and clay often varies gradually and continuously over space, as might 
water content, pH, organic content, thickness, etc. Soil scientists have traditionally imposed upon 
this continuum a set of nominal soil types (categories or kinds); these are mathematical fiats that 
are artifacts of a certain technology. They might, for example, be some function of measurable 
quantities of a sample of the soil. If pH< 7.3 and percentage sand< 10 and percentage organic< 
2, and thickness < 1.1 m, then it is type X. Soil chemical and physical properties may constitute 
fields that vary more or less continuously and somewhat independently across geographic space. 
In such a system, soil boundaries are pieces of the 7.3 pH isoline, the 1.1 meter isopach, and so 
on. With perfect information, we can apply that typology to the continuous variables and get crisp 
boundaries for soil types. We can then represent the patch of soil of that type as a polygon, or 
draw the boundary with ink, and see soil as a world of geographic objects with crisp boundaries. 
These are scientific fiat boundaries, not bona fide boundaries. If we change the classification 
system, our boundaries will move; some of them will disappear; new ones will have to be created. 
If we do not keep the original continuous data, we cannot even determine where the new 
boundaries should be. 
Soil scientists in the field of course do not measure everywhere. They observe where the 
boundaries probably are, and draw them on the map, based on changes in underlying geology, in 
vegetation, in topography. Then they dig in the middle of each polygon, and use the results 
obtained in the laboratory to classify the whole polygon. It is said that soil scientists seldom 
sample near the boundaries, perhaps because they know that they are not really there. Fields for 
each soil property would be a better thing to store. The polygons with crisp boundaries 
misrepresent the phenomenon, but they were the best that could be done with static, printed, ink-
on-paper media. 
5.6 Fiats in the realm of concepts 
The concept of fiat boundary was introduced as a means of doing justice to the fact that we divide 
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up the spatial reality out there in more or less arbitrary fashion into sub-regions. But there is an 
element of arbitrariness or fiat also in the domain of our concepts themselves: we can partition the 
family of spatial concepts, of geographic entity-types, in more or less arbitrary ways into sub-
concepts. 
Imagine the instances of a concept arranged in a quasi-spatial way, as happens for example in 
familiar accounts of color- or tone-space. Suppose that each concept is associated with some 
extended region in which its instances are contained, and suppose further that this is done in such 
a fashion that the prototypes, the most typical instances, are located in the center of the relevant 
region, and the less typical instances are located at distances from this center in proportion to their 
degree of non-typicality. Boundary or fringe cases can now be defined as those cases that are so 
untypical that even the slightest further deviation from the norm would imply that they are no 
longer instances of the given concept at all. 
In this fashion counterparts of the familiar topological notions of boundary, interior, contact, 
separation, and continuity can be defined for the conceptual realm, and the notion of similarity as 
a relation between instances can be understood as a topological notion (Mostowski 1983; Petitot, 
1994). In the realm of colors, for example, a is similar to b might be taken to mean that the colors 
of a and b lie so close together in color-space that they cannot be discriminated with the naked 
eye. A similarity relation is in general symmetric and reflexive, but it falls short of transitivity, and 
is thus not an equivalence relation. This means that it partitions the space of instances not into 
tidily disjoint and exhaustive equivalence classes, but rather into overlapping circles of similars. 
This falling short of the discreteness and exhaustiveness of partitions of the type that are 
generated by equivalence relations is characteristic of topological structures. In some cases, there 
is a continuous transition from one concept to its neighbors in concept-space, as for example in 
the transition from lake to marsh to wetland. In other cases, circles of similars are separated by 
_gaps (regions of concept-space that have no instances). This is so regarding the transition from, 
say, lake to reservoir. 
Terms like 'strait' and 'river' represent arbitrary partitions of the world of water bodies. The 
English language might have evolved with just one term, or three terms, comprehending the range 
of phenomena stretching between strait and river or, in French, between detroit and fleuve. For 
while the Straits of Gibraltar are certainly not a river, and the Mississippi River is certainly not a 
strait, there are cases- such as the Detroit River and the Bosporus~ that exist on the borderline 
between the categories. All are flat, narrow passages that ships can sail through between two 
larger water bodies (lakes, seas), and all have net flow through them, due to runoff, etc. Is Lake 
Erie really a lake, or just a wide, deep part of the river-with-five-names that is called the St. 
Lawrence as it flows into the sea? Well, that depends on what you mean by 'lake'. 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we have presented some reasons why ontologies for geographic objects will differ 
from the ontologies of everyday objects commonly examined by philosophers and cognitive 
scientists. For one thing, topology and part-whole relations appear to be much more important in 
the geographic domain. Research on this topic must be careful to distinguish the domain of the 
real world from the domain of computational and mathematical representations, and both of these 
from the cognitive domain of reasoning, language, and human action. Human practice is an 
important part of the total ontology. Cultural differences in categorizations are more likely to be 
found for geographic entities than for objects at table-top scales. Geographic ontologies are more 
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strongly focused on boundaries, and a typology of boundaries is critical. Work involving formal 
comparisons of geospatial and cartographic data standards and dictionary definitions in a variety 
of languages will provide an important starting point for the cross-cultural experiments with 
human subjects that will be needed to refine the details of the ultimate ontology of geographic 
kinds. 
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The breadth of the subject material of spatial or geographical information science has 
been articulated in a number of places, but it is argued here that efforts to address the 
broad ontological and methodological issues have been mis-guided. This has led to a 
number of questions as to the appropriateness of the subject area as either a coherent 
science, or as a science at all. This paper reviews some of these statements, and argues 
that the recently proposed metaphor of a continuum between the extremes of science and 
system is wrongly inspired. It is argued that the continuum concept arises from the 
ability of people to locate and identify themselves in terms of the end-points and the 
continuum. An alternative relationship between the system and the science can be seen 
as a cycle involving the crucial processes of concept development, implementation, 
testing and revision. It is therefore seen that a critical use of Geographical Information 
Systems fits with a number of ideas of the nature of science in general and the 
advancement of scientific knowledge in particular. The argument presented here, 
therefore supports the study and development of GIS (whichever meaning is ascribed to 
the acronym) as part of a scientific endeavour. Two further consequences follow from 
the discussion. First, it reaffirms the frequent assertion that education must focus on 
spatial theory, as opposed to training (which is specific to one or more systems). Second, 
the use of systems is an important stage in the development of spatial theory, providing a 
testing ground for that theory, and, furthermore, because all theory is a state of 
knowledge at a particular time, which becomes embodied within a system, use of the 
system should always be informed by a critical understanding of that theory. 
Introduction 
Recently it has been suggested that those working in Geographical or Spatial 
Information Science should pay some attention to the intellectual basis of their research 
in general, and how it fits with ideas about scientific endeavour in general. Discussion, 
which has centered around whether GIS is a collection of software items gathered into a 
system composing a tool (Taylor and Johnston, 1995), or is a coherent field of scientific 
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